

CONFIDENTIAL NO # 0433-76
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R00050008-0
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
76-7013/10
Executive Registry

*act not
Det long
no needed
20/8/76
SA/PCJ*
National Intelligence Officers

12 March 1976

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : George A. Carver, Jr.
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

SUBJECT : [] Thoughts on USIB
Reorganization

1. Attached is an informal note from my colleague [] (the NIO for Conventional Forces) which was intended only for me but which I think merits your reading. You can skip the first paragraph, which deals with issues we have already discussed at some length; but Dan's specific thoughts on the reorganization of USIB (beginning at paragraph 2) are worth considering.

2. Dan has a background, hence, perspective that is unique. In his Navy career, he has alternated in duty between intelligence billets and line positions at sea, including command in combat at various echelons from a single ship to a flotilla of which he was the admiral. He has also served most effectively on the DCI's staff as an NIO. He thus can view the USIB problem from a point of view of a military consumer, a military intelligence officer, and from the perspective of your office.

[]
George A. Carver, Jr.
D/DCI/NIO

cc: Mr. Lehman

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R00050008-0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

George
Since I am submitting my views in final
draft form vice retyped DRAFT
AC

12 March 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT : USIB Reorganization

1. You requested that any strong feelings on various re-organization ideas be provided to you. I continue to agree with your draft memorandum of last week on the position of the NIO structure, recommending the deferral of some other broader Community type reorganizations until certain basic decisions had been made. It well covered the subject. Specifically, I favor your option for the NIOs as a separate DCI staff element (under a leader who for cosmetic conformity to the Executive Order should not be called "Deputy" but rather something else.) I regard the options placing NIOs under any part of the CIA structure as not good in that the NIOs would necessarily appear to be part of one agency (and in due course probably become so). I concur in your rationale for not subordinating them under the IC staff -- although this option is less objectionable than the others. I also favor continuation of the "extended range functions" as presently limited as useful to the DCI, although I have not yet found the need to move in on reconnaissance as have some of our colleagues. I do not favor the restoration of any significant

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

-2-

group of drafters styled a 1a ONE - because such an organization reduces participation by the community in the highest and most important level of national production. I also favor a strong (but separate) voice for CIA in USIB deliberations and, as is explained below, more rather than less participation by the individual military services.

2. In your discussion, you specifically recommended deferral of restructuring USIB at the present time. I agree again but do wish to lay out for your future consideration some thoughts on USIB reorganization particularly as it concerns participation by the military services.

3. There are two conflicting considerations on the role of the military services in substantive intelligence discussions and the possible effects of such roles.

A. One viewpoint considers that with a voice for DIA (or some reconstituted variant) and the separate services as well at USIB, the military in effect have four votes toward substantive decisions. This in turn can allow a monolithic stand against the wishes of those agencies not similarly unified. In addition, so many of the positions taken by service representatives are parochial in

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

-3-

nature and often waste needless and valuable time at the conference table. Assuming that NIEs and SNIEs continue to represent the DCI's text (vice the USIB members) and that voting at USIB meetings will not be instituted, this argument does become specious in a practical sense. I have observed that parochialism is not exclusively reserved to the services and others are just as obstinate with much smaller parishes.

B. An opposing viewpoint holds that because the services (out of tactical necessity) will continue to have analytical skills, often unique experiences, and practical as well as theoretical knowledge on military matters they should have at least as strong a voice in (reconstituted) USIB deliberations as they do at present. This also has the advantage of having no tendency toward suppression of dissenting views. The DCI can best be served by being advised of both sides of contentious substantive issues particularly where the subject matter (e.g. military) may be outside his background knowledge. With some 14 years in the intelligence business, I have observed at USIB deliberations some personalities of very strong personal and professional opinion (a recent Director DIA and a slightly earlier one at NSA readily come to mind) whose single voice could well ignore opinions he did not share. Such opinions, while they may seem parochial, may also be right. Actually we have all observed that when parochialism manifests itself at the USIB table, either orally or in dissenting footnote, it is so very patent that it redounds to the discredit of its exponent.

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

CONFIDENTIAL


CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

-4-

4. In this assignment I have observed genuine (and not illogical) fear of military dominance in substantive intelligence and less strongly manifest, but nonetheless there, a fear of the appearance of being dominated by the military. The hypersensitivity reflected by the latter is obviously an overreaction which should be watched, lest it lead to the underrepresentation of military viewpoints.

5. The outcome of any OSD reorganization of military intelligence remains unknown, but it is not beyond reason to foresee a somewhat truncated DIA working for OSD, and a smaller J-2 working in the Joint Staff. If both have estimative functions, we are liable to see efforts to seat both at a reconstituted USIB, possibly at the expense of the service intelligence organizations. Should such come to pass, I favor, and so recommend, that the military services continue to have at least as much voice in substantive intelligence output at national level as at present.


DEB

25X1

Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP91M00696R000500040008-0

CONFIDENTIAL